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I. Introduction
As the number of vehicles continues to climb road congestion will become a more
prominent feature of urban centers and will likely worsen over time. This thesis will show that
the most simple and effective way to combat congestion is the implementation of road pricing
schemes in and around major metropolitan areas. For the most part the benefits of such a system
outweigh the potential costs. These tolling systems force commuters to internalize the marginal
social cost of driving, as opposed to only paying the average social cost and incurring a
deadweight loss.
This paper will first provide a review of the literature, tracing the theoretical development
of congestion pricing from its early roots to modern studies. Following this review a section on
economic principles that are integral to the study of road pricing, specifically the concept of
marginal cost pricing and how to reach the efficient quantity of traffic will be discussed. This
will be followed by a study of several cities where congestion pricing tried. The last section of
this paper makes the case for using road pricing in major cities.
The economic foundations of road or congestion pricing were first put forward by
William S. Vickrey, Alan A. Walters, and Carl S. Shoup in the 1960’s. There was, they argued,
an imbalance between what a motorist was willing to pay and what they were made to pay for
travelling by road. This was a result of roads being paid for with flat taxes rather than fees for
travel. As a result roads seemed free to the average commuter, and thus there was a tendency to
over consume. This overconsumption led to congestion, gridlock, and traffic accidents. These
conditions all caused a loss in time to commuters, which was increased with every additional car
added to the overburdened roadway.
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The answer to this problem was theoretically simple, though politically onerous: place a
charge on motorists equal to the marginal social cost their driving would impose on others. In
doing so the imbalance and overuse would correct itself as drivers diverted to less well-travelled
routes or changed the times they drove to avoid the new explicit cost. If the demand for
roadways was inelastic and the supply limited, this system would result in a more even
distribution of traffic and a reduction in congestion. The only problem that remained was the
practical difficulty of ensuring payment of the toll, without causing slowdowns at tolling stations
which would make the problem of gridlock even worse. Technology provided the answer to this
issue and now tolling can be done at any speed. Singapore’s ERP lanes are the physical proof
that variable rate road pricing not only has come of age, but that it can be used as an effective
policy to curb congestion in and around urban areas.

3

II. Theory and Literature Review
The starting point for any study of congestion pricing is the works of William S. Vickrey
and A.A. Walters, both economists, who first wrote about the concept during the 1950’s and
60’s. Facing urban growth following the Second World War, and a massive increase in the
number of cars on the roads, both Vickrey and Walters identified congestion as a problem for
commuters and government alike. Vickrey first wrote about the problem in regards to the New
York subway system in 1952, postulated the idea of increasing the fares during peak times would
ease congestion.1 He argued that such a price increase would not actually reduce the traffic flow,
but would increase it by spreading traffic out over a longer period of time and distributing it
more efficiently.2
His basis was built on the cost in time to commuters as well as established economic
principles for demand models. By imposing a higher cost to travel during the peak times, and a
lower cost during off-peak hours, he showed that an average family would be made better off
monetarily if they shifted their travel habits only slightly to take advantage of the lower cost
during off peak times.3 Based on his experience with railroad and subway systems he suggested,
that to avoid the bottleneck that might occur by collecting such tolls, that every person wishing
to travel be issued a card that could be verified by a machine. They would then be billed based
on the time and destination of their journey.4
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Congestion can, generally, be divided into six categories, each of which has its own set of
causes, effects, and solutions. The first is single interaction, where two units of transportation,
cars in this case, are in such proximity that at least one must slow down in order to avoid an
accident or collision. Normally, single interaction congestion is a problem in areas of light traffic
and the delay to each participant is roughly the same as the delay they are causing to another
person.5 Multiple interaction simply refers to a higher density of traffic in which one might
expect even longer delays.
Bottlenecking occurs when the capacity, or in this case the number of available lanes or
road space, is insufficient to meet the demand of the users. This can vary with time, so an area
that at 10pm might be completely congestion free might be subject to a bottleneck at 7:30am.
Bottlenecks develop naturally around areas of limited space that are preceded by higher capacity,
a two lane tunnel connected to a four lane highway as an example. A triggerneck is caused by a
bottleneck when traffic that has no intention of using the area afflicted by a bottleneck is delayed
by the congestion resulting from the bottleneck. Traffic that is backed up and preventing drivers
from taking their desired exit from taking or merging is a good illustration of this phenomenon.6
Network and control congestion is normally a municipal problem as it deals with a
buildup of congestion that necessitates the use of some form of regulation to control or mitigate
it. Traffic lights, stop signs, or routing limitations are the hallmark of this form of congestion.
Finally, there is general density congestion which is based on the density of transportation as
whole, regardless of what form it takes. General density also covers the argument for
constructing more roads or lines of service. Even if the different types of transportation do not
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directly affect each other building more infrastructure for either will, due to the oversaturation
and finite space, become increasingly expensive and time consuming.7
Each of these forms of congestion can occur, either independently or in concert, in either
a city or a highway situation. While road pricing is a potential solution for any of these it should
also be noted that other methods, such as gas taxes, import duties on cars, subsidized rail or bus
travel, or emissions controls on vehicles can also be employed, with varying degrees of success.
The difference in approach between congestion pricing and a gasoline tax or an import duty is an
important one, however, as the consumer has the ability to mitigate their costs by spreading out
or taking alternative modes of transportation to minimize their marginal cost. Commuting will
still take place, but with the addition of the toll the commuter faces more explicit choices on how
much they will drive.
At the same time as suggesting potential solutions to congestion Vickrey also took aim at
the root cause of the problem: The idea that transportation infrastructure should be free to use by
motorists. This idea, which he lambasted as “perverse”, had its roots not in economics, but in
political expediency.8 Vickrey, using the example of the New York bridges and tunnels, it made
no sense to impose a toll on the newest bridges to assist in paying for them, but not levy at least
an equal toll on the older bridges for their upkeep. The inevitable result, he argued, would be that
any rational commuter would, naturally, take the free bridge over the toll bridge, valuing money
more than their time and causing massive congestion around the free bridges.9
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The proximate problem of congestion, a lack of available routes and an overabundance of
travelers, did, however, have a simple answer: constructing more and more infrastructure to
compensate. Vickrey tackled this issue too, arguing that the investment in new infrastructure,
based on the idea that it would, at some level, be profitable, usually resulted in an inaccurate
charging scheme that did not represent the marginal cost to the consumer.10 While as discussed
above there are at least six types of congestion that exist, but, with reference to the idea of
expanding infrastructure Vickrey believed the bottleneck situation could be addressed.
A bottleneck situation exists where there is some sort of fixed capacity and, at a specific
point, that capacity is less than the demand. As long as the demand remains lower than capacity
there will be few or no delays, but as demand increases, so too do the wait times. Bridges,
tunnels, lanes of traffic, and power lines are all subject to bottlenecks.11 Without tolls, there will
be spikes of congestion during peak times, as the capacity of the bridge or traffic lanes is static.
To expand the available capacity is an explicit expense, one that takes time and further disrupts
traffic cycles and causes the very bottlenecking that the construction of new capacity is intended
to prevent.12 As a result, Vickrey argued, it was more sensible to simply impose a toll, which
represented an additional source of revenue for the government, and allow individuals to make
their own decisions. Some might pay the toll, others would seek alternative routes, and even
more might avail themselves of public transportation or share rides.13
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A traffic system can only handle so many cars before it reaches its maximum capacity
and, while a government can build more infrastructure to attempt to ease the problem this has
been shown to be less than cost effective. Using Washington, DC as an example in 1963 Vickrey
estimated that for every $3000 dollar car added to traffic during peak times a $23,000 investment
had to be made to offset the additional vehicle.14 Marginal cost pricing is charging a price equal
to the extra expense involved in producing an extra unit of output. Commuters, through taxes,
pay the average cost of driving on a road, but not the actual marginal cost which lowered
congestion taken into account. To correctly apply road pricing the price of the toll must be set to
equal to the marginal social cost to society that the driver's journey imposes on other drivers.15
With systems like London this is done with a day by day charge, whereas in Singapore this is
done by charging by the number of trips through tolling gantries, but each are trying, within
limits, to adhere to this basic idea. These charges should, ideally, be small but fairly frequent and
they should change to allow for different times or roads, incentivizing uses at off hours or taking
alternate routes.16 Without some form of road pricing inefficiency develops and society as a
whole suffers costs due to increased congestion, pollution, and even accidents.
This concept illustrated in the standard model of congestion in Figure 117 with a uniform
road, normal with and without junctions, All commuters are assumed to be the same except for
their marginal willingness to pay, which is given by demand curve D. The marginal private and
marginal social benefits (MPB and MSB) are set equal to each other as well as to D. The
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efficient equilibrium is found at point C, where the marginal social cost and the demand curve,
which is also the MSB, intersect. However, the actual equilibrium is found at point B where
average social cost (ASC) is equal to the marginal willingness to pay. This means that drivers are
only paying the ASC, and as a result an externality develops in the form of a marginal congestion
cost, represented by the distance between points A and B. This results in the area of ABC being a
dead-weight loss.18

Imposing a toll moves the consumer back along the demand curve towards C, which
corresponds to the efficient quantity of traffic on the road at a given time. To be effective the toll
18

Ibid.

9

would have to equal line segment CE, which would force motorists to completely internalize the
cost of their decision to drive. As a result of the toll the flow of traffic would become optimized
at point C, while the rectangle CEGF would represent revenue gained by collection of the toll.19
These proceeds could be used to cover the cost of implementing and maintaining a system
capable of imposing this toll, and to subsidize public transportation, which would further lower
road congestion.
A. A. Walters, a contemporary of Vickrey, applied similar ideas to the highway system
during the 1960s. Arguing against other economists that there should be a decrease in taxes he
suggested that the reverse would actually be more effective. Pointing to examples in the rail
industry and the airline industry, he advanced the idea that marginal cost pricing had been
misapplied by previous writers who had focused only on the decrease in demand that would
result if a tax was leveled on gasoline or more tolls were levied. To counterbalance the loss of
demand on the roads there would be, Walters predicted, an upswing in demand for the closest
competitor, in this case the railroads.20
Like Vickrey, Walter's plans for how to implement either the tax increase or the road tolls
looked to technology. Cars would be equipped with a mileometer, which would indicate that a
toll was being leveled by a raised flag much like a taxi, or else purchase a daily sticker indicating
the payment of the toll. Those utilizing stickers would be charged more per unit than those
utilizing the milometer to both encourage a shift to the milometer and also give a slight discount
to those who made daily trips into and out of the controlled zone.21 To ensure compliance he
19
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suggested the use of cameras to record anyone driving without having the toll.22 In particular he
singled out large cities, London and New York specifically, as being ideal places to impose tolls
due to the limited means of entrance or exit, which would make actually implementing road
pricing much simpler.23 These limitations on entrance indicate another factor of road pricing, the
inelasticity of demand of commuters for roads.
There are two types of elasticity-inelastic, where the demand or supply of a product does
not rise or fall at a corresponding rate relative to changes in price, and elastic, where the supply
or demand is sensitive to changes in prices. The demand for road lanes is inelastic, as individuals
must drive to and from their jobs daily. This inelasticity of demand is most clearly seen in the
peaks where congestion is generally at its worst: rush hour traffic as commuters try to reach their
jobs in the morning and return from them in the evening. With an individual's livelihood relying
on them reaching their place of employment motorists are faced with an inelastic demand for
routes to their destinations. During such times the more direct or desirable routes are
overburdened and quickly reach their capacity. Congestion pricing addresses this inelasticity by
imposing a toll that encourages people to stagger their arrival and departure times, take a
different route, or switching to a different form of transport. These changes shift the demand
away from a specific route and on to less used roads or public transport, spreading the capacity
out more uniformly.24
This inelasticity of demand can vary based upon times, as off peak travellers are more
sensitive to changes in price than those travelling at peak times.25 In the case of Milan an
22
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increase of 1 percent in the toll is estimated to have caused a 0.3 percent decrease in trips into the
controlled zone.26 These decreases are similar to the results found in London and Singapore, and
usually come with a corresponding increase in the use of public transportation as the drivers take
the lower cost option and switch from one form of transport to another in response to the toll.
In a different paper for the World Bank in published 1968, Walters directly discussed the
idea of roads as public goods and how this was misleading. The salient features of a public good
are that it is non-exclusionary and non-rivalrous. In other words a public good cannot be easily
denied and the use of it does not detract from anyone else utilizing it. In the case of roads the
addition of a vehicle can lower the enjoyment of another person driving on it. On small private
roads this might not be the case, but with regard to heavily travelled routes it most certainly is
and, as a result, these roads do not function as pure public goods.27
The massive expense of public roads makes it difficult to allocate to any one individual
the cost of expanding the road or building the bridge, as a result the cost must be divided over the
population as a whole. This, however, is inequitable as there will be people charged for a benefit
that they do not utilize. Further, while infrastructure represents a large upfront cost and then
periodic upkeep, road pricing is a source of revenue. This income can itself be allocated to help
maintain the existing infrastructure, build new lanes for travel, or supplement public transit.
This leads us to the question of equity, one of the main arguments against road pricing that has
been cited in virtually every attempt to either implement it or to repeal it. The potential for
inequality does indeed exist within any road pricing scheme and can be broadly lumped into

Matthew Gibson and Maria Carnovale, “The effects of Road Pricing on Driver Behavior and Air Pollution,”
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three categories: who pays, who benefits, and how are the externalities distributed?28 When
considering who is paying the toll most road pricing is done by time and location, thus
commuters entering and exiting the Central Business District during peak hours in the morning
and afternoon are the users most likely charged
The second category of equity effect revolves around, who benefits. No matter how
congestion pricing is set up, to be effective it has to be capable of charging everyone a price that
reflects the marginal social cost of a trip.29 By imposing the cost consumers are shifted to
different times and routes, lowering congestion and increasing travel times for all motorists. As
each commuter gains in time by not spending it in traffic, the monetary charge is, according to
Vickrey, less than the potential gain.30
Another benefit of congestion pricing is reduced pollution. Pollution is usually measured
in terms of nitrogen oxides (NOx), various kinds of particulate matter 10 micrometers in size or
less (PM10), and carbon dioxide (CO2). The first two are associated with negative effects on
health and the last is a contributing factor in global warming.31 With these health risks mitigated
or reduced there is a benefit to society both in terms of a reduction of healthcare costs for related
illnesses and also as an increase in life expectancy per capita.32 All congestion pricing schemes
have some associated reduction in pollution, even if that is not their avowed goal, because the
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number of cars driving at peak times is diminished either by drivers taking different routes,
which lower the concentration of vehicle emissions at congested points, or by taking lower
emitting public transportation.
In the case of Milan the benefit in welfare has been estimated at 3 billion dollars. A
referendum to continue the congestion pricing scheme resulted in 80 percent voting in favor of
the Ecopass system.33 This vote, which flies in the face of the normally negative views the public
has for road pricing schemes, indicates that the residents, both inside and outside of the
controlled zone, felt that they received some benefit from the policy.34 This added benefit is also
present in London, which saw an increase in life expectancy for both the population within the
charging zone and those outside of it.
From the outset, roads are undervalued and underpriced. The benefits that society
receives from roads is greater than the cost to the average commuter for building or maintaining
them.35 But how are these benefits measured and who do they affect? There are several methods
for valuing the social benefits of congestion pricing, and taken as a whole they go a long way to
allying some of the arguments against such a policy. One of the earliest and easiest is the
increase in speed for traffic within a congested area, as an increase in speed equates to a decrease
in the time a commuter takes to get to their destination.36 Another deceptively simple model for
estimating the benefit to society is in the reduction of congestion, measured by the number of
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cars on the road at peak and off peak times. If the premise that any congestion represents a cost
to society, any reduction of it would therefore constitute an increase in social benefits.
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III. Case Studies
Introduction
While tolls, bridge fees, and wheel taxes have been a part of transportation history for
many hundreds of years the modern history of congestion pricing as a policy only truly began in
the latter half of the twentieth century. The increasing number of automobiles on the road created
two new dilemmas for regulators: traffic congestion and pollution. The idea of road pricing was a
cheap and easy way to control both of these factors and a number of cities in the last sixty years
have implemented it, with varying levels of success. This section will examine several examples
of congestion pricing in cities around the world.

Singapore
In response to rising urban congestion Singapore enacted the Area License Scheme
(ALS) in 1975 and updated it to an electronic system, the Electronic Road Pricing Scheme (ERP)
in 1998.37 The city-state of Singapore is unusually well suited for congestion pricing as it is
located on an island at the tip of the Malay Peninsula. The congestion pricing measures were
intended to supplement an earlier attempt in 1972 to limit the number of vehicles by imposing an
import duty on vehicles equal to 45 percent of their market value and a registration fee of 25
percent (in 1995 this fee was increased to 55 percent).38 All of these schemes have common roots
in two major studies, one in 1967 and another in 1974. Both studies concluded that the only way

Sock-Yong Phang and Rex S. Toh, “Road Congestion Pricing in Singapore: 1975 to 2003,” Transportation
Journal 43 (2004): 16-21.
37
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to lower congestion and also accommodate Singapore’s growth would be to limit car ownership
and usage.39
As outlined in section two, one necessary criterion for an effective implementation of
congestion pricing is the ability to limit access to and from areas. In Singapore, this is relatively
easy to do because access to the Central Business District (CBD) was initially going through
twenty-two specific entrance points (though over time this number increased to thirty-three).4041
It is worth noting that Singapore was a city of over four million people when this policy was
under consideration and that an application of congestion on this scale had not, to this point, been
attempted.42
Although limiting the number of private vehicles entering the CBD, the government of
Singapore wished to exempt vehicles that affected business, public transport such as buses, and
low profile conveyances like motorcycles. In addition, public service and military vehicles were
also exempted.43 The ALS utilized physical licenses that were purchased and displayed on
vehicles entering the Restricted Zone (RZ). The policy was very successful. Authorities set a
congestion price of S$3 a day or S$60 a month. Many thought that this policy would not work
because it would be unenforceable during the morning commute. However, the policy resulted in
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a staggering 43 percent decrease in the total number of motor vehicles travelling within the
Restricted Zone (RZ) within only four weeks.44
This system lasted for almost thirty-three years with only minor changes, such as
extending the time that the congestion charge was in effect in the mornings by an hour. In 1995
the Singaporean government committed almost S$200 million to spur the adoption of an
electronic system that would update the ALS.45 By September of 1998 the ERP was installed.
This system is based on radio frequency identification, optical detection and has taken advantage
of various advances in both imaging and smart card technology. Each car was fitted with a
transponder In-vehicle Unit (IU) at a cost of less than S$300 per vehicle, and the government
further subsidized the transition by paying almost half of the cost for the upgrade.46
The IU requires the insertion of a debit card equipped with a smart chip before making
any journeys to through the ERP area. Visitors to Singapore from Malaysia or elsewhere are able
to rent an IU, though most have found it more efficient to simply purchase and install one
outright if they enter the city with any regularity.47 As the vehicles enters the city it must pass
through a number of gantries where a double layer of sensors first charges the debit card inserted
into the IU and then records the vehicle type and location. The transaction takes place
instantaneously, confirmed by the IU in the car with a beep, and the commuter can continue
unmolested upon their way. In the event of insufficient funds the ERP forwards the offending
vehicle’s information to a central computer and a fine is issued. A network of cameras record the
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license plate to ensure that a charge is leveled even upon vehicles that are not equipped with an
IU.48
While the stated intention of the ALS and the ERP was to reduce the number of cars on
the road at peak times, there were associated effects on the health of residents due to a lowering
of air pollution. While experiencing a massive economic growth spurt during from the early
1980s through the late 1990s, Singapore managed to maintain a moderate to good level on the
pollutant standard index while also increasing the number of vehicles on the road by 26
percent.49 Even with this increase in commuters the peak morning and evening times travel at
speeds ranged from 25 to 30 kilometers per hour, in contrast with a city like New York where the
average is only 10 kph.50
Because Singapore was the first location where congestion pricing was implemented, it
has been central to several studies on the effects that policy changes have on the civilian
population. Two of the areas affected were retail prices and welfare. An increase in the cost of
the ERP had ramifications beyond the morning commute. Different real estate sectors saw
increases and decreases in value when the ERP was raised. The retail sector saw a 19%
difference between properties within the Restricted Zone (RZ) versus those outside the RZ
following a S$1 increase in the ERP in November 2010.51 Evidence suggests that a fluctuation

48

Ibid.

Anthony T. H. Chin, “Sustainable Urban Transportation: Abatement and control of TRaffic Congestion and
Vehicular Emissions from Land Transportation in Singapore,” Environmental Economics and Policy Studies 3
(2000): 372-373.
49

50

Ibid, 358.

Sumit Agarwal, Kang Mo Koo, and Tien Foo Sing, “Impact of Electronic Road Pricing on Real Estate Prices in
Singapore,” Journal of Urban Economics 90 (2015):58.
51

19

in value might be related to the loss of foot traffic caused by the cost associated with traveling.52
Such a dramatic variance was not reflected in either office or residential real estate prices.
Another consideration in the case of Singapore is the effect that the ALS and ERP had on
overall welfare. While there were exemptions allowed for those carpooling and motorcycles the
fact remains that, for some, the cost to enter the CBD was simply too high.53 Those who could
not pay the toll incurred significant scheduling costs, making them worse off than they were
before either the ALS or ERP was imposed.54
The issue of welfare has, at least in Singapore, been partially assuaged by a robust public
transport system that consists of buses and rail lines that make millions of trips into and out of
the city center daily. Buses are the most numerous and most used used of all public
transportation with over 3300 of them in service, running 240 routes, for a total of almost 3
million trips during a normal business day. Interestingly, these “public” transports are owned by
private corporations, but they are licensed by the Land Transport Authority (LTA) and must
conform to their strict standards. In addition they are not allowed to set their own lines of
service, the LTA mandates both companies’ running times and routes.55
This extensive bus system is further supplemented by the Mass Rapid Transport (MRT)
rail system and the Light Rapid Transport (LRT) both of which consist of approximately 141 km
of line and carry upwards of a million passengers a day. Despite the massive costs associated
with rail, there are plans to expand this service over the next 30 years.56 The downside of rail
52
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transport in this case has not been in its ability to move people quickly, but the poor integration
of their stations into the development of the city as a whole and its impracticality when compared
to simply hopping onto a bus or taxi.57 In an attempt to correct these deficiencies older stations
are being refurbished and new LRT lines are being built to better tie the rail system to the needs
of the city.58
Last of all is the taxi service, which boasts some of the lowest prices in the world. Over
18,000 taxis make their way through the streets of Singapore, carrying approximately 1 million
passengers with them. In contrast to the rail and bus lines these taxis are not regulated by the
LTA, however stiff competition has kept the price of travelling by taxi very low.59 These three
services, taken together, provide options to those wishing to enter the CBD and thus directly
address the question of welfare. Prices on these alternatives are low, either due to a mandate by
the LTA, in the case of rail or buses, or due to the brisk competition within the taxi system.60
The lessons learned in Singapore echo very strongly Wilson and Vickrey’s initial ideas
for congestion pricing. Tolls are dynamic and attempt to approximate the marginal social cost of
the journey, electronic toll verification eases any chance of bottlenecking developing at tolling
areas, and the shift to public transportation has been accompanied by further investment in rail
development to compensate. Allowing private companies to handle the bus system, while
mandating standards and routes, as well as the taxis has kept the prices on public transportation
low, making this policy less burdensome for the ordinary worker. While there are explicit costs
and downsides associated with ERP, it has achieved its initial aim of lowering congestion with
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startling success. At the same time there have been measureable positives associated with the
policy, ranging from increased speeds to better air quality, that represent a net social benefit to
the citizens of Singapore.

Milan
With over half of its population using cars or motorcycles Milan has a car ownership rate
that is one of the highest in Europe, surpassed only by Rome and, as a result, it also has a high
level of atmospheric pollution. Its levels of airborne particulates regularly exceed the European
Union mandated 50 micrograms per cubic meter. 61 After trying several measures, such as
banning older vehicles that could no longer pass the increasingly rigorous emissions standards,
the city implemented a congestion pricing scheme in order to reduce pollution within an 8.2
square kilometer area.62
This scheme, called Ecopass, started at the beginning of 2008 and imposed fees from 2 to
10 Euros with the cost being determined by the vehicle’s engine type.63 No tolls were assessed
on hybrids and electric cars while progressively higher tolls were leveled on gasoline engines.
Diesels and heavy goods vehicles (any vehicle with a mass of over 3500 kg), had the highest cost
levied on them, but were still allowed within the zone. In addition there were discounts for
vehicles making repeated entries into the city, a fifty percent rebate for the first fifty entries
followed by a forty percent rebate for a further fifty entries. After one hundred visits the rebates
were capped for the year. Residents of Milan could purchase a yearly pass that ranged from 50 to
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250 Euros.64 Motorcycles and scooters were completely exempt from this toll, as were police,
public transportation, and ambulances.65
The charge had a dramatic initial result with the level of particulates in the atmosphere
falling by as much as 23%, though these estimates do not take into account any other factors that
might have influenced the drop.66 This drop in pollution was accompanied by a reduction of cars
entering the area of approximately 23% during the controlled times and 17% during the rest of
the day. There was also a change in when trips occurred after the introduction of the toll, with an
increase in traffic occurring within an hour of the end of tolling for the day. As expected there
was a corresponding increase in the use of public transportation within the controlled zone with
the number of passengers increasing by 9.2%.67
Milan experienced a social cost savings of 10.4 million Euros, a large portion of which
came from the significant drop in the number of traffic accidents.68 The impact of Ecopass on
government costs and revenues was a little more difficult to quantify due to the exclusion of the
penalty payments in the total revenue to the city. It was suggested, however, that these penalty
rates might be as high as three times the total toll revenues reported, netting the city of Milan a
total of approximately 50 million Euros.69
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The increase of public revenue and the decrease of pollution, the avowed goal of the
program in the first place, indicated that Milan’s Ecopass system was a great success. It was
extended for another year. However, after the initial drop in environmental pollution following
the implementation of Ecopass levels of particulate matter started to slowly creep back up to
their original highs.70 This recursion to high averages was likely due to the specific provisions of
exempting motorbikes, which in turn incentivized drivers to switch to these higher polluting
vehicles.71 While black carbon was decreased in the Ecopass area when compared to outside of
the controlled zone, other particulate matter measurements showed no discernable difference
when compared to levels before the implementation of Ecopass.72
There were additional effects on the city as a whole. Accounting for other factors, studies
showed rents increased by 0.75 percent after the Ecopass policy started, which indicated that
some residents valued the increase of welfare that they associated with the potential reduction in
pollution highly enough to pay slightly higher rents.73 At the same time there was between a 1.2
and 1.8 percent decrease in the market pricing of houses.74 The effect on housing nearly mirrored
the cost to a commuter for an annual Ecopass, suggesting that the cost of the toll was being
passed on from the residents to those selling houses.75
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The mixed success of Ecopass to achieve its goals can be traced back to the way in which
the scheme was implemented in the first place. The exemption of motorcycles and scooters
incentivized their use, which potentially offset the reduction of vehicle traffic. Compounding this
problem was the narrow times that the charge was in effect, which made it easy to shift travel to
other times.76 This example highlights the inherent difficulties in any congestion pricing scheme.
To be effective in reducing pollution the policy must be targeted, and uniformly enforced across
all generally used vehicles that are the major causes of pollution. Further, the times and locations
tolled cannot be too specific, unless these routes are the only means in and out of the controlled
zone. Otherwise, commuters will make the economically rational decision to travel during those
times or through the avenues where the tolls are not leveled.

London
As early as the 1960’s the city of London was experiencing a boom in the number of
vehicles travelling in and out of the city on a daily basis. Car ownership in the United Kingdom
had doubled from half a million in 1958 to just over a million in 1963 and there was considerable
public outcry about the high levels of traffic within the city.77 This criticism led the government
to consider congestion pricing. However, this idea was rejected due to a perceived surplus
capacity of the public transportation network, which opposing politicians argued commuters
would use instead over time without the need to set up congestion pricing to push them in that
direction.78 This extra capacity, however, was soon overtaken by urban population growth. By
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2000 the Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, promised in his campaign for office to implement
a road pricing scheme if elected.79
Faced with the dual problem of promulgating this policy as a law and implementing it
effectively on the ground. Fortunately for him the 1999 Greater London Authority Act provided
him exactly the powers needed, as its provisions explicitly addressed the Mayor’s authority to
enact a road pricing plan.80 With almost a million commuters entering and exiting the city daily,
and spending almost 30 percent of their transit in gridlock, the public had identified congestion
and an increase in public transportation as the city's two most important issues.81 With a mandate
to action Livingstone first applied a £5 charge for privately owned cars, higher for commercial
vehicles, to enter the central London area. The pricing was based on the Road Charging Options
for London, an independent study supported by the government in 2000. It suggested that that the
£5 charge would achieve the goals of lowering congestion during peak times, shifting travellers
onto public transportation, reducing car related emissions, and also provide a revenue stream that
could be used to further buttress the public transportation of the city.82
The practical application of the London Congestion Charge was based on the work done
in Singapore and followed the same model of area licensing that was established there. Vehicles
paid a daily charge of £5, that was increased to £8 in the summer of 2005, to enter the zone
between 7:00 am and 6:30 pm. There were the normal provisions for emergency and government
vehicles, motorcycles and mopeds, as well as sizable discounts or exemptions for residents and
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disabled drivers.83 Those who fail to pay upon entry have until 10 pm before they face late
payment fees, and in the event that the commuter does not pay by midnight there is a fine of
£100, , which can be cut in half if paid within 14 days.84 This flat fee system is worth
commenting on as it flew in the face of the traditional pricing plans for congestion charges. In
the past it was believed that to be truly effective congestion pricing had to vary by time,85 but
one of Mayor Livingstone’s avowed goals was that the pricing feel “fair” in order to create a
lasting system.86
The effects of the London congestion charge were seen relatively quickly with increased
speeds for commuters increased by 10 or 20 percent between 2002 and 200487 and traffic delays
reduced by almost 26%.88 Additionally there was a reduction in PM10, particulate matter, of
almost 12 percent and NOx, nitrogen oxides, levels fell by approximately 12 percent.89 These
declines, specifically the reduction in N02, in emissions were shown to have added between 18
to 183 years of life per 100,000 population to residents in the Greater London area.90
The lowering of congestion within the city corresponded with the expected uptick in the
use of public transportation as commuters shifted away from driving into the city. The bus
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services in particular saw massive changes, both in speed, with a 21 percent increase within the
controlled zone, and in the number of passengers serviced an increase of 38 percent.91Even with
this increase the bus and underground system maintained reliable and consistent schedules of
service.92
Retailers in the congestion zone during this period saw lower year end earnings in 2002,
the year after the charge went into effect, and a majority pinned the blame on the congestion
charge. However other factors such as fear of terrorism and the economic slowdown could also
explain this dip.93 In fact, some research showed that the congestion charge had statistically
insignificant impact on the retail sector.94
To consider the effects on equity we must understand one of the facets of the argument in
transportation economics-namely the problem of social exclusion. There are several definitions,
but the underlying concept is that social exclusion is any process which prevents residents, or
those in close geographic proximity, from participation in any normal activities for that society. 95
With regards to London, it is clear that there is indeed less traffic within the central control zone
than there was previous to the congestion charge being implemented, but there has not been a
correspondingly large drop in people entering or exiting the city. The charge has merely changed
the means by which people commute, transferring drivers over to public transportation,96 and as
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a result there was little social exclusion experienced in London’s road pricing scheme. There are
tangible gains to society, with one study putting the total net benefit to London at 67 million
pounds a year for the first 30 months of the congestion charge.97
The exemptions and reductions in the toll, for the disabled and residents, also helped to
make this policy an equitable one since they addressed at risk social groups that might see an
undue penalty otherwise.98 As with any policy there will be a cost to some group and, though
congestion pricing did indeed represent a burden on lower income households, the overall benefit
to society, in terms of increased traffic flow, health, and lower accident rates, outweighs the
inconvenience to these smaller groups.99
It is certain that London’s vast public transportation network has aided, if not outright
enabled, this policy to be so successful while remaining relatively equitable. One of the main
objectives of the program from the start was to shift people from individual vehicles to public
transit and it is clear that this goal was met. Public opinion has shifted with the introduction of
the toll as well, from an initial split of 40 percent for and 40 percent against the idea to 55
percent for and only 30 percent against.100 Here again, the starting goal, to market this policy in a
way that the public would perceive as both fair and reasonable, has proven to be successful.
Using a flat rate rather than a dynamic one was unorthodox, but has contributed to this
perception.
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The method may be slightly different, but the idea and the implementation could well be
lifted straight from the pages of Vickrey or Wilson’s early work on the subject. The toll is paid in
advance, cars are monitored by the omnipresent CCTV’s, the tolls is set as close as possible to
marginal cost, and, while there are exceptions and discounts, the toll has been applied as broadly
as possible. As might be expected, the issues with this policy were mainly political and technical
in nature. It is clear that technological advances and innovation could make road pricing schemes
even more efficient, and many such changes have already been suggested for London and other
cities.101
As two of the largest cities where road pricing has been initiated a comparison between
the effectiveness of the London Congestion Charge and Singapore’s ERP is unavoidable. Both
use electronic tolling and enforcement to curtail any potential gridlock at access points, though
the ERP remains the more effective system. This is based on two factors: accessibility and
difficulty to set up. While Singapore has 45 gantries that need to be maintained for tolls, London
would require no less than 174 in order to set up an equivalent system.102 Another difference
between the two systems is the number of exemptions given to vehicles. London has opted for a
wider range of exclusions and discounts, while Singapore has been much more stringent. The
result of this is a greater effect on traffic patterns within Singapore.103
The pricing and payment of the two systems is also very different, with the London
Congestion Charge being applied as a flat amount for a day, while the ERP drivers in Singapore
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are charged by the number of they gantries the pass through.104 While these individual charges
are lower, they more effectively capture the concept of congestion pricing by tying the decision
to use a gantry to an immediate cost, rather than London’s daily or monthly payment. In
addition, the ERP rates are graduated, further deterring bad driving habits by having incremental
increases over a period of minutes to penalize either speeding up or slowing down at a gantry to
get a better rate.105 Added to the distinction by time there is a greater attempt to distinguish types
of vehicles under the Singapore system, where vehicles are differentiated by type.106
These differences, distinct as they are, do not necessarily reflect better or worse systems
as both road pricing schemes were tailored to a specific city, rather than a theoretical generality.
Singapore and London cover vastly different physical areas, with the London Congestion Charge
covering almost 22 square kilometers as compared to Singapores ERP which only encompasses
7 square kilometers.107 Congestion times differed as well, with Singapore seeing traditional rush
hour congestion while London experienced a steady rate of high congestion throughout the
day.108 The ERP system is certainly closer to the ideal road pricing system outlined by Vickrey,
but it is equally clear that the London model has unique difficulties to overcome and lessons to
offer.
Finally, when dealing with such a policy it is imperative to address political difficulty as
well as the social equity in the successful creation of a congestion pricing plan. As noted above it
is very clear that there is a cost associated with a road pricing scheme, either in time or money,
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and that such a cost might well be a burden upon at-risk groups. Here is where the example of
London can, and should, be invoked however. A pricing scheme can be undertaken if there is a
sufficient mandate from the people, strong political leadership, and care is taken to tailor the plan
around the existing needs of the city and population.109 There is no one size fits all solution in
road pricing and the goals in each implementation must be clear and realistic, while the effects
on public transportation or the poor must be thoroughly considered and, as much as possible,
accounted for if a successful program is to be set up.110

109

Livingstone, “Challenge of Congestions,” Planning Theory & Practice 5:4 (2004): 498.

110

Ibid.

32

IV. Analysis and Conclusion

The idea of road pricing is not a new one, but its successful implementation in major
metropolitan areas across the world in the last forty years has given considerable support to its
application as a useful urban transport policy. From the seminal example of Singapore to the
recent developments in London, Milan, Stockholm, and dozens of other cities and towns the
trend has been slowly moving towards forcing motorists to internalize the full cost of their
decision to drive, and to do so in an equitable manner. The basis of the policy, marginal cost
pricing and a congestion charge to move commuters back along the demand line until they reach
their willingness to pay, has been more and more rigorously applied, first with area licensing,
then with vehicle type, and finally with sophisticated electronic pricing that varies by time and
place.
These developments, naturally, have also raised new questions about its efficacy as a
policy. Can it truly be applied equitably? What are the costs and benefits of implementing it? Is it
effective? How should such a scheme be set up? It is worth looking at several of the points that
one of the most active proponents of road pricing, William S. Vickrey, laid out during the 90’s
and apply them to the systems set up in London, Singapore, and Milan. The first and most
important principle for any road pricing scheme is price. The charge for each trip must reflect the
marginal social cost of the trip in order to be truly effective. At worst it must at least equal this
cost, though it can be higher in order to affect some larger social or revenue goal.111 Marginal
cost pricing can be seen in every city with congestion pricing, some using dynamic charges
which reflect the size of the vehicle or the amount of pollution it emits, while others, such as
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London, use a flat charge. Either system has its own advantages, but both in theory and practice
attempt to cleave to this principle.
As illustrated above in the theory section the problem of congestion, essentially, is in an
over consumption of road by drivers who do not pay the real price of driving. To a large extent
the public believes that roads are, or should be, free to travel on. At best there is lip service paid
to the idea of roads being paid for with tax dollars. But such funds are inefficient and inequitable
in equal measure. In the case of public works, the citizen who does not drive, but has still paid
their taxes, has been forced to pay for a benefit that they do not receive, while those who do
drive pay too little for the benefit. Those that drive are, therefore, encouraged to drive more than
they would if they were paying the actual cost of such travel.
Congestion is the end result of this overconsumption, and here again there is a cost to
society as each car added to the road only exacerbates the problem and imposes a cost on every
other driver. In the words of Walters: “The nth driver does not consider the effect his travel has
on the nth plus one driver.” The logical response to this imbalance is the leveling of a toll that is
equal to this cost. Theoretically, this is a simple matter, but it raises practical questions about
when these charges should be leveled, how they should be leveled, and who should be charged?
The largest question, how to effectively set up an efficient system of road pricing, has been
solved with the advent of new technology. Electronic Road Pricing systems, such as the one in
Singapore, offer a quick and easy method of ensuring payment by travelers without increasing
their travel time.
Such an electronic system also addresses two additional points made by Vickrey, namely
that tolls should vary smoothly over time and that every vehicle must be charged. With manual
tolling changes in toll rates can lead to gridlock, as drivers cluster in an attempt to make it
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through while the charge is still low. Singapore’s ERP system has taken this into account, and
now has graduated tolling rates that rise and fall based on the time. The use of gantries which all
cars must pass through as the trigger for a charge allows for charging without a car changing its
speed. Cameras automatically record and ticket drivers who pass through without paying the toll.
Even Singapore, however, falls short of the ideal system as there are exemptions for public and
governmental vehicles using the road. These should, according to Vickrey, also be charged, even
if it is only as a means of accounting and budgeting to allow for more accurate pricing.112
As the historical examples demonstrate, the benefits of congestion pricing increase the
more the basic principles are adhered to, but no two policies address the precisely the same
issues. Each policy must be tailored to fit the needs and geography, both physical and political,
of the city. In Singapore, an island city with an authoritarian government, the ability to make
quick and decisive changes was helped by its relatively small area. Its initial experiment with
road pricing, an area licensing scheme, was intended simply to reduce the number of private cars
on the road and followed earlier heavy taxes levied on the importation and ownership of
vehicles. While the taxes failed to achieve this goal, area licensing succeeded as congestion fell
rapidly and traffic speeds increased.
Such a system, however, was still not as efficient as it possible because it was based on
static rates rather than the more desirable varied rate toll propounded by Vickrey or Walters. This
parallels the London Congestion Charge, though for a different reason. While Singapore initially
used flat rates because there was not a better system at the time, London’s road pricing scheme
opted for flat rates even though a better system was available. there were two reasons for this
decision. The first was geography. To make the congestion charge fully automated in the greater
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London area, which covers some 22 square kilometers and it would take approximately 200
electronic tolling gantries. The second was the political situation at the time. While the problem
of congestion consistently ranked as one of the most pressing issues in London according to
public polls, any road pricing scheme had to address the issue in order to be accepted by the
public.
In London’s case the way to deal with both of these issues was to make the congestion
tax so that (barring heavy goods vehicle, who pay more and those with exemptions or discounts)
the public would perceive the toll as “fair”. This ploy has worked as more people support the toll
now than when it was introduced. However, this also means that the London Congestion Charge
is somewhat inefficient. While the average motorist pays more of the cost of their trip, they are
likely paying too much for travel during off peak times and too little during rush hour. While
there is some justification for this decision because London has constant congestion there
remains room for improvement in the system.
In contrast, Milan set up its Ecopass system to curb pollution associated with vehicle
traffic. While the system has been successful in reducing vehicle traffic, the air quality changes
have not been as profound as expected. If judged by its stated goal, Milan has only partially
achieved what it set out to do when it first implemented Ecopass. At the same time, however, it
has also seen a reduction in congestion and an increase in speeds which is the goal of most road
pricing schemes. Milan case did not apply the toll uniformly, which violates one of the main
points made by Vickrey for a truly efficient system. By allowing exemptions to motorcycles and
not tolling every route into and out of the control zone the Ecopass system backhandedly
incentivized behaviors that were counter to their original intentions.
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In addition to the cost to commuters in terms of time there is also a cost to cities who
attempt to address congestion and bottlenecks with the construction of additional infrastructure.
While some building is necessary, the problem of congestion is usually not a lack of lanes but
rather a clustering of motorists attempting to over utilize during a given period. The demand for
roads can usually be met by existing supply if trips were staggered and less desirable paths were
used. The construction of new infrastructure can actually increase demand instead. When you
consider the cost of building new infrastructure to accommodate congestion the idea of roads as
pure public good is even untenable.
If heavily travelled roads are not considered pure public goods then the question of equity
shifts from the propriety of a commuter paying for the use of it to the more practical concern of
who should pay for it. The sensible answer is that those who make greater use of the road should
pay more than those that do not use it with any frequency. In contrast to taxes that are leveled
across the board by a state or federal government, road pricing directly touches this first group
while avoiding charges on the second. Whether driving a totally electric car or a diesel engine
truck, both vehicles occupy the finite amount of roadway and both contribute equally to
congestion. But, where a gas tax would recoup some of the cost for maintaining the road from
the truck, the electric car is, at least partially, a free rider.
This hypothetical situation illustrates the point that, rather than being inequitable, road
pricing can actually be a fairer system, as well as a more effective policy. With gas mileage
increasing and a reluctance to levy new taxes, or raise old ones, congestion pricing represents a
new source of revenue. If this revenue, less the cost of building and maintaining the road pricing
system, is used to subsidize and expand public transportation then the argument about inequity
becomes weaker. This was demonstrated in London, as Mayor Livingstone’s goal was to cause a
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shift from cars to the underground and bus systems. In his own words the buses, “are now more
reliable than at any time since systematic records began in the late 1970’s”.113
This increase in public transport to offset the increase caused by the congestion charge
also goes to the heart of the dilemma of a road pricing scheme and its effects. While there is a
gain in traffic speed and a lowering of urban congestion it is only achieved by forcing people to
alter their habits by the application of a significant toll. In areas where the is no significant public
transportation service the cost on working individuals is, to a large extent, unavoidable. They
must simply pay the toll or else risk forfeiting their income. However, going back to the original
concept as outlined by Vickrey, the commuter is saving in time by the reduction of congestion
and this does counterbalance some of the cost of the toll, as well as the additional benefit of
lowered atmospheric pollution.
The argument can be seen in two ways. The enactment of a toll imposes an undue
hardship on lower income travellers, alternately the imposition of a toll is merely correcting for
the over consumption caused by commuters paying only the average social cost. There is no easy
answer to the first argument, except that individuals are priced out of markets regularly and
which is nothing more than the nature of the supply and demand. There is a demand for road use,
an inelastic one, and as a result people will pay the price to gain the benefit, whether it be the
marginal social cost or the average social cost. At the same time, the revenue realized from
congestion pricing should be used to incentivizes economically efficient behaviors. This change
could be as simple as taking a different route to the CBD or driving on off peak hours, either one
of which would result in a lowering of pollution and congestion in their own right.
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The purpose of congestion pricing is not to force an undue penalty upon those that cannot
afford to pay; instead it is to accurately represent the real cost of driving and force commuters to
confront and internalize this cost. In the absence of tolls there are no immediate prices to indicate
this real cost to consumers, and the over consumption that results from this imposes more costs
in terms of time to each motorist. The efficient, and equitable, policy action to combat this is
road pricing. The example of Singapore’s ERP shows that it is possible to create a system that is
effective, but not onerous. London shows that even a flat rate can have a strong effect upon the
habits of drivers, encouraging the shift away from peak times and returning revenue to support
an expansion of public transit. Finally, while its end result is still in debate, Milan’s Ecopass
system has seen similar reductions in congestion and the corresponding increases in speed that
are predicted by every road pricing model.
The advances in technology used in Singapore's ERP system show how future congestion
pricing might look like. Every vehicle would be charged, if only to better approximate the
marginal cost associated with vehicles entering traffic. The machine in the car would ding as a
motorist passed through a gantry making them aware that you have been charged, which
reinforces the idea that they are trading money for time. The ability to change times gradually at
tolling stations approximately models the changes in marginal cost over time and limits the
attempts to take advantage of the system by slowing down or speeding up. The availability of
other options allows consumers a choice of when and how to travel. All of these examples are
directly in line with the initial theory of congestion pricing.
There is a distinction that must also be made between what is done with congestion
pricing and what should be done. No congestion pricing scheme has yet reached the level of
economic efficiency envisioned by Vickrey and Walters. The technology exists, the theory is
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sound, but it is in the political application of road pricing that in all examples fall short. Even in
an authoritarian government such as Singapore there are still improvements that could be made.
In more democratic nations congestion pricing is only as strong as the political establishment that
implements it. London compromised on a dynamic rate for the sake of "fairness" and Milan
failed to uniformly charge all vehicles. These two cities are excellent examples of the difficulty
in gathering sufficient political approval to utilize road pricing. Compromises are made and the
result is a less efficient system. However, even if these road pricing schemes are not the ideal
system of Walters or Vickrey, they do have the expected results. Congestion is lowered,
pollution diminished, and travel times decreased in these cities. A slightly inefficient policy is
better than a completely inefficient one.
In the light of these examples, and others taking place from the United States to Sweden,
the implementation of road pricing is becoming a more appealing policy. While concerns remain
it has proven to be a tool that works in reducing both congestion and pollution, if applied
rigorously and fairly. The benefits, and revenues, of such a policy if applied correctly can
enhance the overall welfare of a society by the increases in time as well as the added life years
gained by lower emissions. While there are still practical issues to be addressed and
improvements to be made congestion pricing remains an effective policy that should be utilized
more fully.
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